Abstract. We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage-maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero. JEL classification: C70, C71, C72, C78
Introduction
Our purpose in this paper is to provide a theoretical study of how the option for unions to delegate the wage bargaining will affect the wage outcome and the incentives for strike activity. Up to now the literature has been mainly focused on strategic delegation on behalf of shareholders. Fershtman and Judd (1987) have addressed the issue of strategic managerial delegation in the context of oligopolistic industries with Cournot competition (see also Sklivas 1987) . Regarding strategic union delegation, Jones (1989a) has shown that a divergence between the objectives of union leaders and union members will naturally arise in a democratic union as part of a rational bargaining strategy. Essentially, the reason is that in many bargaining situations, commitment can be valuable, and the union members can credibly commit to a bargaining stance, which they could not otherwise sustain, by delegating authority to a negotiator whose objectives make this stance an optimal one.
In case the union and the firm bargain over wages and employment levels, union delegation implies that inefficient bargains are reached (on a pseudo contract curve), which are preferred by the union to the efficient bargaining solution (on the true contract curve). In case the union and the firm only bargain over the wage (and the firm sets employment unilaterally), union delegation may mimic the monopoly union outcome where the union chooses its most preferred wage. More recently, Conlin and Furusawa (2000) have provided an explanation of why senior union members may represent the union in contract negotiations with a monopolist when parties also negotiate about the bargaining agenda. By strategically delegating contract negotiations to wage-maximizing individuals, the surplus-maximizing union may be better off than if surplus-maximizing individuals negotiate the contract.
But these previous studies have considered complete information frameworks so that delay in reaching an agreement (strikes or lockouts), which waste industry resources, cannot occur at equilibrium.
1 So, we go beyond the analysis offered in Jones (1989a) and Conlin and Furusawa (2000) by developing a model that enable us to investigate in presence of strategic union delegation how private information affects the wage level and the delay in reaching an agreement. 1 Strikes data seem to have a significant impact on the wage-employment relationship for collective negotiations (see, e.g., Kennan and Wilson 1989) . 2 See Kennan and Wilson (1989, 1993) for surveys of bargaining models with private information and their relation to strike data. See Kennan (1986) for a survey of the empirical results on strike activity.
Precisely, we develop a model of wage determination in which both the union and the firm have private information. In the first stage, the union chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing delegates or to use wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members or workers who are protected from being dismissed) who will negotiate the wage with the employer. So, only the union has the option to delegate bargaining authority. As pointed out by Jones (1989a) , it is the differential ability to commit (here, the union can delegate bargaining authority to workers who cannot be laid off), not differences in the desire to do so, that underlies one-sided delegation models. If one considers objectives for negotiators, which do not represent the true preferences of any worker, then it may be more appropriate to allow both parties to be able to delegate bargaining authority to a negotiator. 3 In the second stage, the wage bargaining occurs. To describe the wage-bargaining process, we adopt Rubinstein's (1982) alternatingoffer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information, which allows the occurrence of strikes at equilibrium. 4 In the third and final stage, the firm chooses the output level to be produced.
As a benchmark we first consider the complete information situation, and we show that the weaker the union is, the more likely it is the union will choose to send wage-maximizing delegates. The choice of wage-maximizing delegates always increases the wage level and decreases the production output (and the employment level) as well as the consumer surplus. Once the negotiators have private information, the complete information results are not always valid. The wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates can be greater than the wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. The less elastic the labour demand is, the more likely it could happen. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the labour demand is sufficiently elastic, then we recover the complete information result, namely, that the wage outcome with surplus-maximizing delegates is always strictly smaller than the wage outcome with wage-maximizing delegates.
The maximum delay in reaching an agreement (or maximum strike activity) is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. From conventional wage-bargaining theory, firm's monopoly power increases the surplus to be divided between the union 3 Jones (1989b) has extended Jone's (1989a) analysis of one-sided delegation to symmetric, twosided delegation case. The negotiators have the same structure of preferences as the concerned parties, but with potentially different taste parameters. A large choice of negotiators is available to each party. Although one party may gain at the expense of the other by the process of delegation relative to self-representation, it is often the case that two-sided delegation leads to utility losses for both parties. 4 The union and the firm bargain only over wages (then, the firm chooses the employment level).
This assumption allows us to model the wage-bargaining process by means of Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model, and to use Watson's (1998) analysis of Rubinstein's model in the case of two-sided incomplete information. and the firm. Monopoly power (price-cost margin) is greater when the firm faces wage-maximizing delegates. As a result, delegating the wage bargain to wage-maximizing delegates raises the potential payoffs for the union and the firm but, in expanding the payoff set (or range of possible payoffs), also increases the scope for delay (longer strikes and lockouts may be needed for screening the private information). We show by means of an example that strategic union delegation can increase substantially the potential delay. Finally, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition such that, even in presence of private information, it is always optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing delegates. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is presented. In section 3 we describe the wage-bargaining game and choice of delegates under complete information. Section 4 is devoted to the wage bargaining with private information. It offers some predictions regarding the strike duration. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The basic model
Consider a market for a single homogenous product, where the demand is given by P ¼ a À b Á Q c , P is the market price, Q is the quantity produced, and c > 0. There is one firm producing the good. Let Å denote the profit level. The only variable input is labour. Technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is normalized in such a way that Q ¼ L, where L is labour input, and the unit production cost of each firm is the wage W. Thus, the profit of each firm is given by
Without loss of generality, we let b ¼ 1. The firm belongs to and is controlled by one risk-neutral owner, whose objective is to maximize profits. In addition, the firm is unionized, and enters into a closed-shop agreement with its riskneutral union. The union objective is to maximize the union surplus:
where W is the reservation wage. The wage rate is determined by negotiations between the firm and the union delegates. Preceding the negotiations, the union may affect the negotiation outcome by selecting delegates whose objective is either to maximize the union's surplus or to maximize the wage rate. We develop a three-stage game. In stage one, the surplus-maximizing union chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing delegates or to use wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members) who will negotiate the wage with the employer. The objective of a wage-maximizing delegate is simply V ¼ W À W. In stage two, the wage bargaining occurs. Finally, in stage three the employer chooses the output level. The model is solved backwards.
In the last stage of the game, knowing that the wage level (W) has already been determined, the employer chooses
to maximize its profits. In stage two, the negotiation takes place. We first consider the complete information bargaining as a benchmark.
Wage bargaining with complete information
First, we consider the case in which the union sends surplus-maximizing delegates whose interest is the same as the union's objective. The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. The firm and the union delegate make alternatively wage offers, with the firm making offers in odd-numbered periods and the union delegate making offers in even-numbered periods. The length of each period is D. The negotiation starts in period 0 and ends when one of the negotiators accepts an offer. No limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement is a possible outcome. The union is assumed to be on strike in every period until an agreement is reached. Both the firm and the union are assumed to be impatient. The firm and the union delegate have time preferences with constant discount rates r f > 0 and r u > 0, respectively.
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To capture the notion that the time it takes to come to terms is small relative to the length of the contract, we assume that the time between periods is very small. This allows a study of the limiting situations in which the bargaining procedure is essentially symmetric and the potential costs of delaying agreement by one period can be regarded as negligible. As the interval between offers and counter-offers is short and shrinks to zero, the alternating-offer model has a unique limiting subgame perfect equilibrium, which approximates the Nash bargaining solution to the bargaining problem (see Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986) . Thus, the predicted wage is given by
5 Two versions of Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model capture different motives that induce parties to reach an agreement rather than to insist indefinitely on incompatible demands. In a first version the parties' incentive to agree lies in the fact that they are impatient: player i is indifferent between receiving xÁexp (Àr i Á) today and x tomorrow, where r i > 0 is player i's discount rate. In a second version the parties are not impatient, but they face a risk that if agreement is delayed, then the opportunity they hope to exploit jointly may be lost: player i believes that at the end of each bargaining period there is a positive probability 1 À exp (Àr i Á) that the process will break down, r i > 0. Thus, r i can be interpreted either as player i's discount rate or as his estimate about the probability of a breakdown of the negotiations.
where the lowerscript 's' means that wage bargaining is between the firm and surplus-maximizing union delegates, and where U 0 ¼ 0 and Å 0 ¼ 0 are, respectively, the disagreement payoffs of the union delegate and the firm. The parameter 2 (0,1) is the union bargaining power which is equal to r f /(r u þ r f ). Simple computation gives us
Obviously, the wage is increasing with the reservation wage W, with the union bargaining power , and with the parameter c. 6 Then, one can easily obtain the equilibrium employment level
as well as the union's payoff and the firm's profit, which are denoted U * s () and Å * s (), and are given by
Second, we consider the case in which the union sends wage-maximizing delegates. Then, the predicted wage is given by
where the lowerscript 'w' means that wage bargaining is between the firm and wage-maximizing union delegates, and where V 0 ¼ 0 and Å 0 ¼ 0 are, respectively, the disagreement payoffs of the union delegate and the firm. The parameter 2 (0,1) is still the union bargaining power which is equal to r f / (r u þ r f ). Simple computation gives us
Again, the wage is increasing with the reservation wage W, with the union bargaining power , and with the parameter c. Then, one can easily obtain the equilibrium employment level
as well as the union's payoff and the firm's profit, which are denoted U * w () and Å * w (), and are given by
From (5), (8), (10), and (13) 
for the case in which the union sends surplus-maximizing delegates, and it is equal to
for the case in which the union sends wage-maximizing delegates. Comparing both expressions yields that the consumer surplus is always lower when the union sends wage-maximizing delegates rather than surplus-maximizing delegates.
In the first stage of the game, the union chooses whether to use surplusmaximizing delegates or wage-maximizing delegates to negotiate the wage with the employer. Comparing (7) with (12) we obtain the following proposition. PROPOSITION 1. The union will send wage-maximizing delegates if and only if
Proposition 1 tells us that (i) for any given union bargaining power 2 (0,1), the more inelastic the product demand is (i.e., c is big), the more likely the union will choose to send wage-maximizing delegates; (ii) for any given degree of elasticity of the demand, the weaker the union is (i.e., is small), the more likely the union will choose to send wage-maximizing delegates. In case the product demand is linear, c ¼ 1, the union will choose to send wagemaximizing delegates if and only if *^. 76. So, if the union is relatively not too strong, then the union will delegate the negotiation task to wagemaximizing delegates.
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Proposition 1 gives us the optimal choice in terms of delegation under complete information, subject to the restriction that the union can only choose between surplus-maximizing or wage-maximizing delegates. In case one allows for a broad class of objectives for union delegates or negotiators, Jones (1989a) has shown that appropriate selection of a negotiator can mimic the monopoly union outcome where the union selects its most preferred wage (on the labour demand curve). For instance, if the union delegates to a negotiator with objective L Á (W À W) 1þcÀc and gives appropriate incentives for the negotiator, 8 the outcome of the negotiation will be the monopoly union wage. But once such objective for the negotiator (an objective which does not represent the true preferences of any worker) is considered, it may be more appropriate to allow both parties, the union and the firm, to be able to delegate bargaining authority to a negotiator.
Both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the Rubinstein's model predict efficient outcomes of the bargaining process (in particular agreement is reached immediately). This is not the case once we introduce incomplete information into the wage bargaining, in which the first rounds of negotiation are used for information transmission between the two negotiators.
Wage bargaining with private information

Perfect Bayesian equilibria
The main feature of the negotiation is that both negotiators have private information. Each negotiator does not know the impatience (or discount rate) of the other party. It is common knowledge that the firm's discount rate is included in the set [r P f , r i ] according to the probability distribution p i , for i ¼ u, f. We allow for general distributions over discount rates. This uncertainty implies bounds on the union bargaining power which are denoted by ¼ r
LEMMA 1. Consider the wage bargaining with incomplete information in which the distributions p f and p u are common knowledge, and in which the period length shrinks to zero. For any perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), the payoff of the union belongs to U * (), U * () Â Ã and the payoff of the firm belongs to
The proof of this lemma, as well as the other proofs, may be found in appendix A. In lemma 1, U * () and Å * () denote, respectively, the SPE utility of the union and the SPE profit of the firm of the complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the union's bargaining power is ¼ . In case the union chooses to send surplus-maximizing delegates, then U * () and Å * () are given, respectively, by expression (7) and expression (8) with ¼ . In case the union chooses to send wage-maximizing delegates, then U * () and Å * () are given, respectively, by expression (12) and expression (13) 
, there exists distributions p u and p f , and a PBE such that the PBE payoffs are e U U and e Å Å.
In other words, whether or not all payoffs within the intervals given in lemma 1 are possible depends on the distributions over types. As Watson (1998) stated, lemma 1 and lemma 2 establish that 'each player will be no worse than he would be in equilibrium if it were common knowledge that he were his least patient type and the opponent were his most patient type. Furthermore, each player will be no better than he would be in equilibrium with the roles reversed.' Since we allow for general distributions over types, multiplicity of PBE is not an exception (even when the game is almost with complete information; see section 4.2). From lemma 1 we obtain proposition 2 and proposition 3. PROPOSITION 2. For any distribution over types, PBE wage bargaining outcomes in case of the union chooses to send surplus-maximizing delegates, W * s (, ), satisfy the following inequalities:
9 Watson (1998) characterized the set of PBE payoffs that may arise in Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offer bargaining game and constructed bounds (which are met) on the agreements that may be made. The bounds and the PBE payoffs set are determined by the range of incomplete information and are easy to compute because they correspond to the SPE payoffs of two bargaining games of complete information. These two games are defined by matching one player's most impatient type with the opponent's most patient type.
Notice that each wage satisfying these bounds can be the outcome by choosing appropriately the distribution over types. The lower (upper) bound is the wage outcome of the complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the union's type is r I u (r P u ) and the firm's type is r P f (r I f ) (and the union bargaining power is ()). For many distributions over types, there is a wide range of PBE: there are PBE in which the wage is close to the upper bound, and there are PBE in which the wage is close to the lower bound (see section 4.2 for some intuition). Expression (16) implies bounds on the firm's employment level, as well as on the firm's output, at equilibrium. PROPOSITION 3. For any distribution over types, PBE wage bargaining outcomes in case of the union chooses to send wage-maximizing delegates, W * w (, ), satisfy the following inequalities
In complete information, the choice of wage-maximizing delegates always increases the wage level and decreases the production output (and the employment level) as well as the consumer surplus. But once the union and the firm have private information, these complete information results do not necessarily hold. COROLLARY 1. In case of union-firm bargaining with private information, the wage outcome with surplus-maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome with wage-maximizing delegates.
be the cutoff value on c which is obtained by equating the lower bound from (17) with the upper bound from (16). The larger the amount of private information j À j is, the smaller the cutoff value c is. Whenever c > c, the standard result of complete information may not hold: sending wage-maximizing delegates might decrease the wage level in equilibrium. Indeed, when the labour demand is inelastic, the objective of the surplus-maximizing delegate and the objective of the wage-maximizing delegate become close. Then, one can always find probability distributions over types such that there is a PBE wage with surplus-maximizing delegates which is higher than some PBE wage with wage-maximizing delegates. The necessary and sufficient condition such that the complete information result always holds is c c. The more elastic the labour demand is, the more likely the wage outcome in case of wagemaximizing delegates will be higher than the wage outcome in case of surplusmaximizing delegates even in presence of incomplete information. There are industries in which unions have a dominant power. One example is the International Typographical Union (ITU) before the seventies. See Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) , Pencavel (1991) . COROLLARY 2. Suppose it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm ( ! 2 3 ). For any distribution over types, if the product demand is sufficiently elastic (c 1), then W * w (, ) > W * s (, ).
The intuition behind this corollary is the following one. Incomplete information in the model takes into account two main features. The first one is the amount of private information in possession of the players. By the amount of private information we mean the size of the set in which player's discount rate is contained and which is common knowledge between the players. The second one is the uncertainty about who is the more patient player, that is, who is the stronger player. When it is common knowledge that the union is stronger than the firm, this second feature disappears, and information tends to play a less crucial role in the process of the negotiation between the firm and the union. The more elastic the product demand is, the smaller the mark-up of price over marginal cost is, and the less uncertainty there is in the wage bargain. Moreover, if the elasticity of product and labour demands is high, a wage increase will imply a significant drop in employment level and, hence, it will refrain surplusmaximizing delegates from demanding high wages. Therefore, the complete information result is recovered once it is common knowledge that the union is stronger than the firm and that the product demand is sufficiently elastic.
Wage bargaining with almost complete information
The previous analysis establishes bounds on the PBE payoffs, but it says nothing about the possible payoff vectors inside the bounds. It would be interesting to study the set of payoffs and the set of wages that are supported by perfect Bayesian equilibria in the wage-bargaining game which is 'close' to having complete information. Watson (1998) has also studied the PBE payoff set of Rubinstein's alternating-offer game under arbitrary sequences of distributions over the players' types which have the same (possibly wide) support, 10 yet which converge to a point mass distribution. That is, he has examined bargaining games in which with high probability a player's discount rate is 10 If r P i and r I i converge (for i ¼ u, f), then the PBE payoffs of the incomplete information game converge to the unique SPE payoff vector of some complete information game.
close to a certain value, yet there is a slight chance that the player's discount rate is much higher or much lower. He has shown that the set of equilibrium payoffs does not converge to that of the complete information, despite that the game converges to one of complete information. More precisely, the set converges from above but not from below in the sense that a player cannot gain if there is a slight chance that he is very patient (has a low discount rate), yet he can suffer if there is a slight chance that he is impatient. In other words, a slight chance of being a patient type can't help a player, whereas a slight chance of being impatient can certainly hurt. The limiting set of equilibrium payoffs is defined by each player's greatest possible discount rate and the limiting discount rates; the players' lowest possible discount rates do not play a role. Watson's main result can be extended to our wage bargaining. It also furnishes intuition that is meaningful for general distributions.
Suppose that there is three possible types for both the union and the firm:
Suppose the distribution over these types r
for both the union and the firm; is the probability that player i's discount rate is r P i , 1 À 2 is the probability that player i's discount rate is r * i , and is the probability that player i's discount rate is r I i . Then, we might wish to know how the set of PBE payoffs or the wage outcomes change as converges to zero, where there is only a slight chance that player i is either of type r . So, PBE wages do not converge to a single wage, despite that the distribution over types converges to a point mass distribution. 11 COROLLARY 3. There exists union-firm bargaining with almost complete information where the wage outcome with surplus-maximizing delegates is not necessarily lower than the wage outcome with wage-maximizing delegates.
Suppose that the firm's type is known, while the union's type is private information to him: the union's discount rate is either r ", ") where " is the probability of the impatient type (r I u ); " is small. The above analysis tells us that there is a wide range of PBE wages. It is possible that, in case of surplus-maximizing delegates, an outcome will be reached close to the upper bound wage, 11 This lopsided convergence follows from the construction of PBE strategies, where players will punish one another if they depart from their equilibrium strategies. An effective form of punishment in the bargaining game is that, when a player takes some deviant action, beliefs about him are updated optimistically -putting probability one on his weakest type. The existence of a very impatient type (a type near r i I , compared with r i * ) allows the threat of such a revision of beliefs, however small the probability of the impatient type. The existence of a very patient type has little effect, since it would not be used in punishing a player.
meanwhile, in case of wage-maximizing delegates, an outcome would be reached close to the lower bound wage,
Then, if the demand is not too elastic, that is, c > r f =(r I u À r P u ) À 1, the wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates is higher than the one that would be reached in case of wage-maximizing delegates.
Maximum delay in reaching an agreement
Inefficient outcomes are possible, even as the period length shrinks to zero. While the scope of possible inefficiency is clear from lemma 1 and lemma 2, what is not so obvious is the potential for delay. The wage bargaining game may involve delay (strikes or lock-outs), but not perpetual disagreement, at equilibrium (see Watson 1998) . 12 In fact, delay is positively related to the distance between the discount rates of the most and least patient types of the players. If the range of types is reduced, then this leads to a smaller range of possible payoffs and less delay. Delay can occur even when the game is close to one of complete information (as the type distributions converge to point mass distributions).
We propose to identify strike activity with the maximum delay time in reaching an agreement. Only in average this measure is a good proxy for actual strike duration.
13 It is not uncommon in the literature on bargaining to analyse the maximum number of delay time that may be expended before reaching an agreement.
14 In the appendix we compute the maximum delay in equilibrium 12 Watson (1998) has constructed equilibria with delay, in which the types of each player behave identically (no information is revealed in equilibrium), players use pure strategies, and players make non-serious offers until some appointed date. 13 In the literature on strikes, three different measures of strike activity are usually proposed: the strike incidence, the strike duration, and the number of work days lost due to work stoppages. See Cheung and Davidson (1991) , Kennan and Wilson (1989) . Since we allow for general distributions over types and we may have a multiplicity of PBE, we are unable to compute measures of strike activity as the ones just mentioned. 14 Cramton (1992) has constructed a sequential equilibrium in a bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, where types are revealed after a maximum of two rounds but delay is directly related to the types of the players. There is also a continuum of other sequential equilibria where types are not fully revealed. In contrast to Rubinstein's model, in which the time between offers is fixed, in Cramton (1992) each player can delay making offers. This ability to delay offers enables each player to commit to not revising or rescinding an offer until a counter-offer is made. Cai (2003) has also analysed the maximum number of delay periods but in a multilateral bargaining. His model has a finite number of Markov perfect equilibria, some of which exhibit wasteful delays. The maximum number of delay periods that can be supported in Markov-perfect equilibria increases in the order of the square of the number of players. These results are robust to a relaxing of the Markovrequirements and to more general surplus functions. Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002) provide a recent survey of bargaining models with incomplete information.
which shows that an agreement is reached in finite time and that delay time equals zero as incomplete information vanishes (in that r P i and r I i converge). In case the union chooses surplus-maximizing delegates, the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is given by
where
is the maximum real time the union would spend negotiating, and
is the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating facing a surplusmaximizing union delegate. In fact, D In case the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates, the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is given by
is the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating facing a wagemaximizing union delegate. Since D (23) and (21) From conventional wage bargaining theory, firm's monopoly power increases the surplus to be divided between the union and the firm. Monopoly power (price-cost margin) is greater when the firm faces wage-maximizing delegates.
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As a result, delegating the wage bargain to wage-maximizing delegates raises the potential payoffs for the union and the firm but, in expanding the payoff set (or range of possible payoffs), also increases the scope for delay (longer strikes and lockouts may be needed for screening the private information).
We provide now an example about the maximum delay. In this example we let r 15 In complete information, wages are higher in case of wage-maximizing delegates, but prices are much higher too. Indeed, surplus-maximizing delegates care about employment (hence, output), which pushes prices down. Moreover, high wages tend to push prices up. 16 We can interpret r i as the annual discount rate and the numbers in table 1 as the maximum number of days needed to reach an agreement. Indeed, the integer part of the maximum delays for Á ¼ 1/365 are exactly the numbers of Table 1 , except when there are brackets (then it is the number in brackets). The data in Table 1 seem consistent with U.S. strike durations reported in Cramton and Tracy (1994) .
are increasing with the amount of private information jr P i À r I i j, (iii) D w is decreasing with c and D s is increasing with c (so the difference between D w and D s is becoming larger the more elastic the demand is). Notice that real delay time in reaching an agreement is not negligible: many bargaining rounds may be needed at equilibrium before an agreement is reached. Results (i) and (ii) hold in general, while result (iii) does not. However, if the union has more private information than the firm has, it is likely that the difference between D w and D s is becoming larger the more elastic the demand is. Indeed, we have:
From proposition 4 we know that if the union chooses to send wagemaximizing delegates then strike activity is going to increase. Before concluding, we briefly investigate whether and when it is optimal to delegate for the union. The necessary and sufficient condition such that it is always optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing delegates is (25) where U * w () and U * s () are given by expressions (12) and (7), respectively. Take the case of a linear demand (c is equal to 1). Then, the above condition (25) becomes
For instance, if it is commonly known that the union is weaker than the firm (i.e., 1 2 ) and the union is not too weak (i.e., ! 2 5 ) then it is optimal for the union to send wage-maximizing delegates.
Conclusion
We have developed a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We have shown that the wage outcome in case of surplusmaximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that one party is stronger than the other and the labour demand is quite elastic, then delegating to wage-maximizing delegates increases for sure the wage at equilibrium. We have shown that strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplusmaximizing delegates. We have also found that strategic delegation can increase substantially delays. From a policy perspective our analysis questions whether one should allow for strategic union delegation (e.g., by means of laws protecting union delegates from being dismissed). From a research perspective our analysis questions theoretical results obtained under complete information as well as empirical studies of the trade union objectives.
Appendix A: Proofs
The proof of lemma 1 is done in two main steps. First, we will show that all strategies that survive the iterative elimination of conditionally dominated strategies impose some bounds on the players payoffs (see lemma A1). Second, we will show that each PBE conforms to lemma A1. There are two players who must agree on a wage W from the set X, where X is the set of feasible agreements: X {W 2 R j 0 W a}. The players either reach an agreement in the set X or fail to reach an agreement, in which case the disagreement event E occurs. The two players have well-defined preferences over X [ E. The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. The firm and the union delegate alternatively make wage offers, with the firm making offers in odd-numbered periods and the union delegate making offers in even-numbered periods. The negotiation starts in period 0 and ends when one of the negotiators accepts an offer. No limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining, and perpetual disagreement is a possible outcome. The union is assumed to be on strike in every period until an agreement is reached. Both the firm and the union are assumed to be impatient. The firm and the union (delegate) have time preferences with constant discount factors f 2 (0, 1) and u 2 (0, 1), respectively.
Let H i be the set of histories after which player i has the move, for i ¼ u, f. Let H H u [ H f . Let h ¼ 0 / be the history at the start of play. A pure strategy of player i is some function s i : H i ! A that maps each possible history after which player i has the move into an action. In each period, the action space for the player who makes an offer is X, while the action space for the responder is {accept, reject}. Let S i be the set of strategies for player i, i ¼ u, f. Let S S u Â S f . Each strategy profile s 2 S induces an outcome which specifies agreement at some date or irrevocable disagreement. Payoffs in the wage bargaining are given as functions of the players' strategy profile according to the vN-M utility functions Y i : S ! R. For any strategy profile s 2 S that leads to an agreement W at period n, let
be, respectively, the firm's payoff and the union's payoff. In case the union chooses a wage-maximizing delegate, the payoff of the delegate is simply n u Á V(W). For any strategy profile s 2 S that leads to perpetual disagreement, let Y i (s) ¼ 0. For h 2 H i , let Y i (s j h) be the payoff of player i in the game conditional on h describing the play and s describing the play thereafter. Define Y i i as the payoff function of player i with discount factor i . The wage-bargaining game with complete information about the players' discount factors has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
The SPE wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates is such that
where W u is the SPE wage outcome if the union delegate makes the first wage offer, and W f is the SPE wage outcome if the firm makes the first offer. Since the union makes the first offer, the SPE wage is
from which we get the SPE profit and the SPE union's payoff:
Similarly, the SPE wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates is such that
where W u is the SPE wage outcome if the union delegate makes the first wage offer, and W f is the SPE wage outcome if the firm makes the first offer. Since the union delegate makes the first offer, the SPE wage is
The players have private information. They are uncertain about each others' discount factors. Player i's discount factor is included in the set
The superscripts I and P identify the most impatient and most patient types, respectively. For solving the wage-bargaining game with incomplete information about the players' discount factors, we use weaker solution concepts for games with incomplete information. DEFINITION 1. Take a set of strategy profiles T ¼ T u Â T f Ì S such that T is a product set, and a type i of player i. Strategy s i is strictly conditionally dominated for type i with respect to T if there exists some s
A strategy s i is strictly conditionally dominated if there exists a strategy s 0 i such that s 0 i performs at least as well as s i after all histories and strictly better after at least one history, subject to s j 2 T j . DEFINITION 2. Take a set of strategy profiles T ¼ T u Â T f & S such that T is a product set, and a type i of player i. Strategy s i is weakly conditionally dominated for type i with respect to T if there exists some s Let SD i (T) be the set of strategies for player i that are not strictly conditionally dominated with respect to T, and let
The set SD 1 contains the strategy profiles that remain after the iterative elimination of strictly conditionally dominated strategies. Let WD i (T) be the set of strategies for player i that are not weakly conditionally dominated with respect to T, and let WD(T) WD u (T) Â WD f (T). We define another iterative process for deleting dominated strategies. The process involves the recursive definition that starts from (WD(SD 1 )) 0 S and goes on with (WD(SD 1 ))
This limit set is the set of players' strategy profiles that are undominated by surviving the cautious iterative elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. 
Proof. First, we characterize the set SD 1 . The method used is similar to that employed by Shaked and Sutton (1984) and others (e.g., Vannetelbosch 1999) . This method looks for bounds on the behaviour of the players and observe that a bound for one player implies a relative bound for the opponent. In turn, this implies a new bound on the behaviour of the original player. For instance, if the union knows that the firm never expects more than Å(W 0 ) in a period where the firm makes an offer, then the union can guarantee itself a payoff close to U(W 1 ) by offering a wage W 1 such that
Iterative application of this logic leads to the characterization. Watson (1994) did it for the case of linear preferences. Since the complete information game has a unique SPE, this logic leads to well-defined bounds. Strategy profiles that survive the iterative elimination of strictly conditionally dominated strategies, s 2 SD 1 , are such that (i) the union never offers the firm a wage such that firm's payoff (undiscounted) exceeds 
u ) (where Å * s ( f , u ) is given by expression (28)). The case of wage-maximizing delegates is similar. This completes the proof of lemma A1.
&
To characterize the set UD we do not require the players to know the probability distribution of types in
We have to assume only that it is common knowledge among the players that player i's type is included in the set
Suppose, now, that players' types are independently drawn, with player i's discount factor drawn from the set [ P i ,
I
i ] according to the probability distribution p i , for i ¼ u, f. Let p ¼ (p u , p f ). Next, we state some properties about the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the wage-bargaining game of incomplete information in which the distribution p is common knowledge between the players. A specification of strategies consists of a strategy s i i for each type i of player i. We can represent this specification as a mapping s i :
Let be a system of beliefs where (Á j h) ¼ ( u (Á j h), f (Á j h)) are the beliefs of the players regarding each others' types, conditional on history h. A PBE is an (s, ) that satisfies: (i) sequential rationality: for each h 2 H, the continuation strategies are a Bayesian equilibrium in the continuation game given the beliefs (Á j h); (ii) correct initial beliefs: (Á j 0 /) ¼ p; (iii) player i's belief about his opponent does not change as a result of player i's own actions; (iv) Bayes' rule is used to update beliefs whenever possible.
To show that each PBE conforms to lemma A1, take a PBE strategy profile s. Suppose that for some k, s 
&
Lemma 2 is a straightforward corollary of theorem 2 in Watson (1998) . From lemma 1 and the above proof we obtain bounds on PBE wage-bargaining outcomes. In case the union chooses to send surplus-maximizing delegates, the bounds are
In case the union chooses to send wage-maximizing delegates, the bounds are Corollary 1 and corollary 2 follow directly from lemma 1, proposition 1, and proposition 2. Finally, corollary 3 is a straightforward application of theorem 4 and theorem 5 in Watson (1998) .
Appendix B: Maximum delay
In case the union chooses surplus-maximizing delegates, the maximum number of bargaining periods the union would spend negotiating, I m 
